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Abstract. The probabilistic (or quantitative) modal µ-calculus is a fixed-point logic de-
signed for expressing properties of probabilistic labeled transition systems (PLTS). Two
semantics have been studied for this logic, both assigning to every process state a value in
the interval [0, 1] representing the probability that the property expressed by the formula
holds at the state. One semantics is denotational and the other is a game semantics,
specified in terms of two-player stochastic games. The two semantics have been proved
to coincide on all finite PLTS’s, but the equivalence of the two semantics on arbitrary
models has been open in literature. In this paper we prove that the equivalence indeed
holds for arbitrary infinite models, and thus our result strengthens the fruitful connection
between denotational and game semantics. Our proof adapts the unraveling or unfolding
method, a general proof technique for proving result of parity games by induction on their
complexity.
1. Introduction
The modal µ-calculus Lµ [11] is a very expressive logic obtained by extending classical
propositional modal logic with least and greatest fixed point operators. The logic Lµ has
been extensively studied as it provides a very powerful tool for expressing properties of
labeled transition systems [21]. Encodings of many important temporal logic such as LTL,
CTL and CTL∗ into Lµ [2], provided evidence for the very high expressive power of the
calculus. A precise expressivity result was given in [9], where the authors showed that every
formula of monadic second order logic over transition systems which does not distinguish
between bisimilar models is equivalent to a formula of Lµ. The logic Lµ has a simple deno-
tational interpretation [21]. However it is often difficult to intuitively grasp the denotational
meaning of a Lµ formula as the nesting of fixed point operators can induce very complicated
properties. To alleviate this problem, another complementary semantics for the logic Lµ,
based on two-player (parity) games, has been studied in [4, 21]. The two semantics have
been proven to coincide and this allows us to pick the most convenient viewpoint when
thinking about the logic Lµ [4, 21].
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In the last decade, a lot of research has focused on the study of reactive systems that
exhibit some kind of probabilistic behavior, and logics for expressing their properties. Prob-
abilistic labeled transition systems (PLTS’s) [20] are a natural generalization of standard
LTS’s to the probabilistic scenario, as they allow both non-deterministic and (countable)
probabilistic choices. A state s in a PLTS can evolve by non-deterministically choosing one
of the accessible probability distributions d (over process states) and then continuing its
execution from the state s′ with probability d(s′). This combination of non-deterministic
choices immediately followed by probabilistic ones, allows the modeling of concurrency,
non-determinism and probabilistic behaviors in a natural way. PTLS’s can be visualized
using graphs labeled with probabilities in a natural way [7, 12, 1]. For example the PLTS
depicted in Figure 1 models a system with two states p and q. At the state q no action
can be performed. At the state p the system can evolve non-deterministically either to the
state q with probability 1 (when the transition p
a
−→ d2 is chosen) or to the state p with
probability 13 and to the state q and with probability
2
3 (when the transition p
a
−→ d1 is
chosen).
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Figure 1: Example of PLTS
The probabilistic modal µ-calculus pLµ, introduced in [18, 8, 3], is a generalization of
Lµ designed for expressing properties of PLTS’s. This logic was originally named the quan-
titative µ-calculus, but since other µ-calculus-like logics, designed for expressing properties
of non-probabilistic systems, have been given the same name [5], we adopt the probabilis-
tic adjective which is meant to emphasize that the models considered are PLTS’s. The
syntax of the logic pLµ coincides with that of the standard µ-calculus. The denotational
semantics of pLµ [18, 3] generalizes that of Lµ by interpreting every formula F as a map
JF K : P → [0, 1], which assigns to each process state p a degree of truth. A key aspect
of the denotational semantics of [18, 3] is the interpretation of conjunction, defined as
JF ∧GK(p)=min{JF K(p), JGK(p)}. This is not the only possible meaningful generalization
of standard boolean conjunction to the real interval [0, 1]. Indeed, different interpretations
for the connectives of pLµ (including the one of [18, 3]) have been proposed in [8], and there
is no a priori good reason to prefer one in favour of the others.
In [15], the authors introduce an alternative semantics for the logic pLµ. This semantics,
given in term of two player stochastic (parity) games [24], is a natural generalization of the
two player (non stochastic) game semantics for the logic Lµ [21]. As in Lµ games, the two
players play a game starting from a configuration 〈p, F 〉, where the objective for Player 1
is to produce a path of configurations along which the outermost fixed point variable X
unfolded infinitely often is bound by a greatest fixed point in F . On a configuration of the
form 〈p,G1 ∨ G2〉, Player 1 chooses one of the disjuncts Gi, i ∈ {1, 2}, by moving to the
next configuration 〈p,Gi〉. On a configuration 〈p,G1 ∧ G2〉, Player 2 chooses a conjunct
Gi and moves to 〈p,Gi〉. On a configuration 〈p, µX.G〉 or 〈p, νX.G〉 the game evolves to
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the configuration 〈p,G〉, after which, from any subsequent configuration 〈q,X〉 the game
again evolves to 〈q,G〉. On configurations 〈p, 〈a〉G〉 and 〈p, [a]G〉, Player 1 and Player 2
respectively choose a transition p
a
−→ d in the PLTS and move the game to 〈d,G〉. Here
d is a probability distribution over process-states (this is the key difference between pLµ
and Lµ games) and the configuration 〈d,G〉 belongs to Nature, the probabilistic agent
of the game, who moves on to the next configuration 〈q,G〉 with probability d(q). This
game semantics offers a clear operational interpretation for the properties associated to
the formulas, explained in terms of the interactions between the controller (Player 1) and a
hostile environment (Player 2) in the context of the stochastic choices occurring in the PLTS
(Nature). The meaning of a pLµ formula F at a state p can be interpreted as expressing
the (limit) probability for the controller to satisfy the property specified by the formula.
In [15], the equivalence of the denotational and game semantics of pLµ on all finite
models was proven. The proof, which adapts the standard technique of [21, 4] used to
prove the equivalence of game and denotational semantics for Lµ, makes essential use of
the fact that memoryless and optimal strategies exist in every finite two-player stochastic
game with parity objectives [24]. This property however, does not hold, in general, for
two-player stochastic (parity) games of infinite size: optimal strategies may not exist, and
an unbounded amount of memory might be necessary even for playing ǫ-optimally, i.e., for
guaranteeing a probability of victory ǫ-close to the optimal one. The general result, i.e., the
equivalence of the game and denotational semantics of pLµ on arbitrary infinite models, is
left open in [15].
In this paper we prove that the equivalence indeed holds for arbitrary infinite models,
thus strengthening the connection between denotational and game semantics. This result,
given that the pLµ games outlined above are natural generalization of standard Lµ games,
provides a justification for the denotational interpretation of the connectives of pLµ of [18, 3].
The generalization of the result of [15] to arbitrary infinite models is of practical interest
since infinite state systems often provide natural abstractions for, e.g., infinite memory,
infinite data-sets, etcetera. Our contribution consists in adapting a proof technique, called
the unfolding method [6, 19], which is adopted in [5] to prove a similar result for a µ-
calculus-like logic designed to express quantitative properties of (non probabilistic) labeled
transition systems. While this is not a difficult adaptation, the result is worth noting since
the question has been open in literature since [15]. Moreover the differences between the
games considered in [5] and pLµ two-player stochastic games, e.g., the fact that Markov
chains are the outcomes of the games rather than just infinite paths, make this result not
immediate from [5].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce some mathe-
matical definitions. In Section 3 we define the syntax and the denotational semantics of the
logic pLµ as in [18, 3]. In Section 4, we define the class of two-player stochastic parity games
that are going to be used to give game semantics to the logic. In Section 5, we define the
game semantics of pLµ in terms of two-player stochastic parity games as in [15, 3] and state
the main theorem which asserts the equivalence of the denotational and game semantics for
pLµ. Lastly, in Section 6, a detailed proof of the main theorem is given.
2. Background definitions and notation
Definition 2.1 (Probability distributions). A (discrete) probability distribution d over a
set X is a function d : X → [0, 1] such that
∑
x∈X d(x) = 1. The support of d, denoted
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by supp(d), is defined as the (necessarily countable) set {x ∈ X | d(x) > 0}. We denote
with D(X) the set of probability distributions over X. We denote with δx, for x ∈ X,
the distribution over X such that supp(δx) = {x}, i.e., the unique distribution such that
δx(x) = 1 and δx(y) = 0, for all y 6= x.
Definition 2.2 (PLTS [20]). Given a countable set L of labels, a probabilistic labeled tran-
sition system is a pair 〈P, {
a
−→}a∈L〉, where P is a set (of arbitrary cardinality) of process-
states, and
a
−→⊆P ×D(P ) for every a∈L. As usual we write p
a
−→ d if (p, d)∈
a
−→.
The transition relation of a PLTS models the dynamics of the processes: p
a
−→ d means
that the process p can perform the atomic action a ∈ L and then, with probability d(q),
behave like the process q. Probabilistic labeled transition system are a natural generalization
of labeled transition systems to the probabilistic scenario: a standard LTS can be modeled
as a PLTS in which every reachable distribution is of the form δp, for some p∈P .
Given a set X, we denote with 2X the set of all subsets Y ⊆ X. Given a complete
lattice (L,≤), we denote with
⊔
: 2L→L and
d
: 2L→L the operations of join and meet
respectively. A function f :L→L is monotone if x≤y implies f(x)≤f(y), for every x, y∈L.
The set of fixed points of any monotone function f :L →L, ordered by ≤, is a non-empty
complete lattice [23]. We denote with lfp(f) and gfp(f) the least and the greatest fixed
points of f , respectively.
Theorem 2.3 (Knaster-Tarski [23]). Let (L,≤) be a complete lattice and f : L → L a
monotone function. The following equalities hold:
(1) lfp(f) =
⊔
α f
α, where fα =
⊔
β<α f(f
β),
(2) gfp(f) =
d
α fα, where fα =
d
β<α f(fβ),
where the greek letters α and β ranges over ordinals.
In the following we assume standard notions of basic topology and basic measure theory
which can be found in, e.g., [10, 22].
3. The Probabilistic Modal µ-Calculus
Given a countable set Var of propositional variables ranged over by the letters X,Y,Z and
a set of labels L ranged over by the letters a, b, c, the formulas of the logic pLµ (in positive
form) are defined by the following grammar:
F,G ::= X | 〈a〉F | [a]F | F ∨G | F ∧G | µX.F | νX.F
As usual the operators νX.F and µX.F bind the variable X in F . A formula is closed if it
has no free variables.
Definition 3.1 (Subformulas). We define the set Sub(F ) of subformualae of F by induction
on the structure of F as follows:
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Sub(X)
def
= {X}
Sub(F1 ∧ F2)
def
= {F1 ∧ F2} ∪ Sub(F1) ∪ Sub(F2)
Sub(F1 ∨ F2)
def
= {F1 ∨ F2} ∪ Sub(F1) ∪ Sub(F2)
Sub([a]F1)
def
= {[a]F1} ∪ Sub(F1)
Sub(〈a〉F1)
def
= {〈a〉F1} ∪ Sub(F1)
Sub(νX.F1)
def
= {νX.F1} ∪ Sub(F1)
Sub(µX.F1)
def
= {µX.F1} ∪ Sub(F1)
We say that G is a subformula of F if G∈Sub(F ).
Definition 3.2 (Normal Formula). We say that a formula F is in normal form, if every
occurrence of a µ or ν binder binds a distinct variable, and no variable appears both free
and bound. Every formula can be put in normal form by standard α-renaming of the bound
variables.
For convenience we only consider, from now on, formulas F in normal form. This allows,
for instance, the definition below to be given as follows:
Definition 3.3 (Variable subsumption). Given a formula F , we say that X subsumes Y in
F , forX 6=Y , ifX and Y are bound in F by the sub-formulas ⋆1X.G and ⋆2Y.H respectively,
and ⋆2Y.H ∈ Sub(G), for ⋆1, ⋆2 ∈ {µ, ν}.
Given a PLTS 〈P, {
a
−→}a∈L〉, we denote with [0, 1]
P or P → [0, 1] the complete lattice
of functions from P to the real interval [0, 1] with the pointwise order. A function ρ :Var→
[0, 1]P is called a [0, 1]-valued interpretation, or just an interpretation, of the variables.
Given a function f :P → [0, 1] we denote with ρ[f/X] the interpretation that assigns f to
the variable X, and ρ(Y ) to all other variables Y .
Definition 3.4 ([15]). The denotational semantics JF Kρ :P → [0, 1] of the pLµ formula F
under the interpretation ρ, is defined by structural induction on F as follows:
JXKρ(p) = ρ(X)(p)JG ∨HKρ(p) = JGKρ(p) ⊔ JHKρ(p)JG ∧HKρ(p) = JGKρ(p) ⊓ JHKρ(p)
J〈a〉GKρ(p) =
⊔
p
a
−→d
( ∑
q∈supp(d)
d(q)·JGKρ(q))
J[a]GKρ(p) =
l
p
a
−→d
( ∑
q∈supp(d)
d(q)·JGKρ(q))
JµX.GKρ(p) = lfp(λf.(JGKρ[f/X]))(p)JνX.GKρ(p) = gfp(λf.(JGKρ[f/X]))(p)
It is easy to verify that the interpretation assigned to every pLµ operator is monotone.
Thus, the existence of the least and greatest fixed points is guaranteed by the Knaster-
Tarski theorem.
The main novelty of [15, 8] in the definition of the semantics of pLµ resides in the
interpretation of the modalities 〈a〉 and [a], for a∈L. The definitions resemble the corre-
sponding ones for Lµ (see, e.g., [21]) but, crucially, in PLTS’s transitions lead to probability
distributions over processes, rather than processes. The most natural way to interpret the
meaning of a formula G at a probability distribution d is to consider the expected probability
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of the formula G holding at a process q, associated by the random choice over processes
induced with d, and this is formalized by the weighted sums in the definition above.
Remark 3.5. As it is common practice when dealing with fixed point logics such as the modal
µ-calculus, we presented the syntax of pLµ in positive form, i.e., without including a negation
operator. This simplifies the presentation of the denotational semantics because all formulas
in positive form are interpreted as monotone functions. A negation operator on (closed)
pLµ formulas can be defined by induction on the structure of the formula, by exploiting the
dualities between the connectives of the logic, in such a way that J¬F Kρ(p) = 1− JF Kρ(p),
for all formulas F and process states p. We omit the routine details.
4. Two Player Stochastic Parity Games
In this section we introduce the class two-player stochastic games used to give game seman-
tics to the logic pLµ. This material in standard, and follows similar presentations, as in,
e.g., [24].
A two-player turn-based stochastic game (or just a 212 -player game) is played on some
arena A=〈(S,E), (S1, S2, SN ), π〉 where (S,E) is a directed graph with (possibly uncount-
able) set of states S and transition relation E⊆S×S. The sets S1, S2, SN form a partition
of S and π :SN→D(S) is called the probabilistic transition function. For every state s∈S,
we denote with E(s) the (possibly infinite) set {s′ | (s, s′) ∈ E} of successors of s. We
require that for all s∈SN , the equality E(s)= supp(π(s)) holds. This implies that the set
of successors of a state s∈SN is non-empty and at most countable. We denote with St the
set of terminal states, i.e., those s∈S such that E(s)=∅.
The game is played on the arena A by three players named Player 1, Player 2 and
Nature, the probabilistic agent of the game. The states in S1 are under the control of
Player 1, the states in S2 are under the control of Player 2, and the states in SN are
probabilistic, i.e., under the control of Nature. At a state s∈S1, if s 6∈ St, Player 1 chooses
a successor from the set E(s); if s∈St the game ends. Similarly, at a state s∈S2, if s 6∈ St,
Player 2 chooses a successor from the set E(s); if s∈St the game ends. At a state s∈SN , a
successor state is probabilistically chosen according with the probability distribution π(s).
The outcome of a play of the three players is a path in A, either countably-infinite or finite
(ending in a terminal state), which we call a completed path.
Definition 4.1. We denote with Pω and P<ω the sets of infinite and finite (non empty)
paths in A. Given a finite path ~s ∈P<ω we denote with last(~s) the last state s ∈ S of ~s.
We write ~s ⊳ ~t, with ~s,~t ∈ P<ω, if ~t= ~s.s, for some s ∈ S, where the dot symbol denotes
the concatenation operator. We denote with Pt the set of finite paths ending in a terminal
state, i.e., the set of paths ~s such that last(~s)∈St. We denote with P
<ω
1 , P
<ω
2 and P
<ω
N the
sets of finite paths ~s such that last(~s)∈S1, last(~s)∈S2 and last(~s)∈SN respectively. We
denote with P the set Pω ∪ Pt and we refer to this set as the set of completed paths in A.
Given a finite path ~s∈P<ω, we denote with O~s the set of all completed paths having ~s as
prefix. We consider the standard topology on P where the basis for the open sets is given
by the clopen sets O~s, for ~s∈P
<ω. This is a 0-dimensional space and, if S is countable, it
is a Polish space. We denote with (P,Ω) the Borel σ-algebra induced by the topology on
P, i.e., the smallest σ-algebra on P containing all the open sets.
To specify the reward assigned to Player 1 when a given completed path ~s is the outcome
of a play, we introduce the notion of payoff function.
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Definition 4.2. A (Borel) payoff function for the arena A is a Borel-measurable function
Φ:P→ [0, 1].
The value Φ(~s), for a given ~s ∈ P, should be understood as the reward assigned to
Player 1 when ~s is the outcome of a play in A.
Definition 4.3 (Two player stochastic game). A two-player turn-based stochastic game (or
just a 212 -player game) is a pair 〈A,Φ〉, where Φ is a payoff function for the arena A.
The goal of Player 1 in the game 〈A,Φ〉 is to maximize their payoff, while the dual goal
of Player 2 is to minimize the payoff assigned to Player 1.
When working with stochastic games, it is useful to look at the possible outcomes of a
play up to the behavior of Nature. This is done by introducing the notion of Markov chain
in A, whose precise formulation is given by the following definitions.
Definition 4.4 (Tree in A). A tree in the arena A is a collection T ⊆ P<ω of finite paths
in A, such that
(1) T is down-closed: if ~s∈T and ~t is a prefix of ~s, then ~t∈T .
(2) T has a root: there exists exactly one finite path ~s= (s0) of length one in T . The state
s0, denoted by root(T ), is called the root of the tree T .
The set of children of the node ~s in T is the set {~t∈T | ~t = ~s.s′ ∧ s′∈S}. We consider the
nodes ~s of T as labeled by the last function.
Definition 4.5 (Uniquely and fully branching nodes of a tree). A node ~s in a tree T , is said
to be uniquely branching in T if either last(~s)∈St or ~s has a unique child in T . Similarly,
~s is fully branching in T if, for every s∈E(last(~s)), it holds that ~s.s∈T .
Definition 4.6 (Markov chain in A). A Markov chain in A is a tree M such that for every
every node ~s∈M , the following conditions holds:
(1) If last(~s)∈S1 ∪ S2 then ~s branches uniquely in M .
(2) If last(~s)∈SN then ~s branches fully in M .
Note that, since the set of E-successors of every state s∈SN is at most countable, every
Markov chain in A is a countably branching tree with a countable set of nodes.
Definition 4.7 (Probability measure PM). Every Markov chainM determines a probability
assignment PM (O~s) to every basic open set O~s ⊆ P, for ~s a finite path ~s = (s0, s1, ..., sn)
with n∈N, defined as follows:
PM(O~s)
def
=
{ ∏
{π(si)(si+1) | 0≤ i<n ∧ si∈SN} if ~s ∈M
0 otherwise
In other words, PM assigns to the basic open set O~s⊆P, i.e, the set of all completed paths
having ~s as prefix, value 0 if ~s is not a path in M , and the product of all probabilities
labeling the probabilistic steps in ~s, otherwise. Note that if there are no probabilistic steps
in ~s, then PM assigns to O~s probability 1, which is the value of the empty product. The
assignment PM extends to a unique probability measure on the Borel σ-algebra (P,Ω) [22],
which we also denote with PM .
Given the previous definitions we can define the expected reward of Player 1 when a
given Markov chainM is the result (up to the behavior of Nature) of a play in the two-player
stochastic game 〈A,Φ〉.
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Definition 4.8 (Expected reward of M). Let 〈A,Φ〉 be a 212 -player game. We define the
expected reward of a Markov chain M in A, denoted by E(M), as follows:
E(M) =
∫
P
Φ d PM .
This is a good definition because Φ is assumed to be Borel measurable, thus integrable.
As usual in game theory, players’ moves are determined by strategies.
Definition 4.9. An unbounded memory deterministic strategy (or just a strategy) σ1 for
Player 1 in A is defined as a function σ1 : P
<ω
1 → S ∪ {•} such that σ1(~s) ∈ E(last(s)) if
E(last(~s)) 6= ∅ and σ1(~s) = • otherwise. Similarly a strategy σ2 for Player 2 is defined as
a function σ2 : P
<ω
2 → S ∪ {•}. We say that a strategy σ1 for Player 1 is memoryless,
if there exists a function f : S1 → S ∪ {•} such that for every ~s ∈ P
<ω
1 , the equality
σ1(~s)=f(last(~s)) holds. Similarly, a strategy σ2 for Player 2 is memoryless if there exists a
function f :S2→S ∪ {•} such that for every ~s∈P
<ω
2 , the equality σ2(~s)=f(last(~s)) holds.
In other words a strategy is memoryless if its decision on any history ~s, only depends on the
last state last(~s) of ~s. A pair 〈σ1, σ2〉 of strategies, one for each player, is called a strategy
profile and determines the behaviors of both players.
Definition 4.10 (M s0σ1,σ2). Given an initial state s0 ∈ S and a strategy profile 〈σ1, σ2〉, a
unique Markov chain M s0σ1,σ2 is determined:
(1) the root of M s0σ1,σ2 is labeled with s0,
(2) for every ~s∈M s0σ1,σ2 , if last(~s)=s with s∈S1 not a terminal state, then the unique child
of ~s in M s0σ1,σ2 is ~s.
(
σ1(~s)
)
,
(3) for every ~s∈M s0σ1,σ2 , if last(~s)=s with s∈S2 not a terminal state, then the unique child
of ~s in M s0σ1,σ2 is ~s.
(
σ2(~s)
)
.
We denote with Ps0σ1,σ2 the probability measure PMs0σ1,σ2
over 〈P,Ω〉 induced by the Markov
chain M s0σ1,σ2 .
Definition 4.11. Given a 212 -player game G= 〈A,Φ〉 and an initial state s∈S, we define
the lower value and upper value of the game G at s, denoted by V al↓(G)(s) and V al↑(G)(s)
respectively, as follows:
V al↓(G)(s) =
⊔
σ1
d
σ2
E(M sσ1,σ2) V al↑(G)(s) =
d
σ2
⊔
σ1
E(M sσ1,σ2).
V al↓(G)(s) represents the (limit) expected reward that Player 1 can get, when the game
begins at s, by choosing his strategy σ1 first and then letting Player 2 pick an appropriate
counter strategy σ2. Similarly V al2(G)(s) represents the (limit) expected reward that Player
1 can get, when the game begins at s, by first letting Player 2 choose a strategy σ2 and
then picking an appropriate counter strategy σ1. Clearly V al↓(G)(s) ≤ V al↑(G)(s) for every
s ∈ S.
Definition 4.12 (ǫ-optimal strategies). Given a 212 -player game G= 〈A,Φ〉, a strategy σ1
for Player 1 is called ǫ-optimal, for some ǫ∈ [0, 1], if the following inequality holds:d
σ2
E(M sσ1,σ2) > V al↓(G)(s) − ǫ
for every game state s. Similarly a strategy σ2 for Player 2 is called ǫ-optimal, if the
following inequality holds: ⊔
σ1
E(M sσ1,σ2) < V al↑(G)(s) + ǫ
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for every game state s. We refer to a strategy as optimal if it is 0-optimal.
Clearly, for every ǫ > 0, there exist ǫ-optimal strategies for Player 1 and Player 2.
However, in general, there could be no optimal strategies, as stated in Proposition 4.18
below.
Definition 4.13. Given a 212 -player game G= 〈A,Φ〉, and an initial game state s, we say
that the game G is determined at s if V al↓(G)(s) = V al↑(G)(s). We say that the game G is
determined if it is determined at every game state s.
The following fundamental result is due to Donald A. Martin [14].
Theorem 4.14 ([14, 13]). Every 212 -player game G=〈A,Φ〉 such that every state s has at
most countably many successor states, is determined.
In this paper we are interested in 212 -player parity games, which are 2
1
2 -player games
〈A,Φ〉 whose payoff function Φ is induced by a parity structure.
Definition 4.15. Given a 212 -player arena A= 〈(S,E), (S1, S2, SN ), π〉, a parity structure
for A is a pair 〈Pr,R〉 where Pr is called the priority assignment and R is a called the
terminal reward assignment. The priority assignment Pr is a function Pr : S → N, such
that the set Pr(S) = {n | ∃s ∈ S.Pr(s) = n} is finite. In other words Pr assigns to each
state s ∈ S a natural number, also referred to as a priority, taken from a finite pool of
options {n0, . . . , nk} = Pr(S). We denote with max(Pr), min(Pr) and |Pr | the natural
numbers max{n0, . . . , nk}, min{n0, . . . , nk} and |{n0, . . . , nk}| respectively. The terminal
reward assignment R is a function R :St→ [0, 1] assigning a value in the real interval [0, 1]
to each terminal state s∈St.
Definition 4.16. Let A=〈(S,E), (S1, S2, SN ), π〉 be a 2
1
2 -player arena and 〈Pr,R〉 a parity
structure for it. The payoff function Φ〈Pr,R〉 induced by 〈Pr,R〉 is defined on every completed
path ~s∈P as follows:
(1) if ~s is a finite path, then Φ〈Pr,R〉(~s) = R
(
last(~s)
)
,
(2) if ~s is infinite, i.e., ~s= {si}i∈N, then Φ〈Pr,R〉(~s) = 1 if the greatest priority assigned to
infinitely many states si in ~s is even, and Φ〈Pr,R〉(~s) = 0 otherwise.
The payoff Φ〈Pr,R〉 is Borel-measurable for every parity structure 〈Pr,R〉 [24].
Definition 4.17. A 212 -player parity game is a 2
1
2 -player game G=〈A,Φ〉 where Φ=Φ〈Pr,R〉
for some priority structure 〈Pr,R〉 on A.
The following fact about 212 -player parity games is the main obstacle one encounter
when trying to extend the proof technique adopted in [15], for proving the equivalence of
the denotational and game semantics of pLµ under finite models, to arbitrary models.
Proposition 4.18 ([24]). There exists a 212 -player parity game (with countably infinite
state space S), such that no optimal strategy exists for either player. Moreover, no memo-
ryless ǫ-optimal strategy exists for either player.
Due to this technical issue, we shall prove the desired equivalence by a different proof
technique inspired by the unfolding technique of [6, 19]. The following simple proposition
will be used in Section 6.
Proposition 4.19. Let G=〈A,Φ〈Pr,R〉〉 be a two player stochastic parity game with arena
A= 〈(S,E), (S1, S2, SN ), π〉. The functions V al↓(G) and V al↑(G), of type S → [0, 1], are
fixed points of the functional F : [0, 1]S→ [0, 1]S defined as follows:
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F(f)(s) =


R(s) if E(s)=∅, i.e, if s is a terminal state⊔
t∈E(s)
f(t) if s∈S1
l
t∈E(s)
f(t) if s∈S2∑
t∈E(s)
π(s)(t) · f(t) if s∈SN
Proof. The result easily follows from the fact, immediate to verify, that given any path
~s.~t∈PA, the equality
Φ〈Pr,R〉(~s.~t) = Φ〈Pr,R〉(~t) (4.1)
holds, i.e., the payoff assigned by Φ〈Pr,R〉 to a path in A does not depend on any finite prefix
of the path. We just prove that, for every s∈SN , the equality
V al↓(G)(s) = F
(
V al↓(G)
)
(s) (4.2)
holds. The other cases can be proved in a similar way.
Let E(s) = {ti}i∈I , for some (necessarily countable) index set I. By definition of
V al↓(G), we need to prove that the equality⊔
σ1
l
σ2
E(M sσ1,σ2) =
∑
i∈I
π(s)(ti) ·
(⊔
σ1
l
σ2
E(M tiσ1,σ2)
)
(4.3)
holds. This is done by proving the two inequalities (≤) and (≥) of Equation 4.3 separately.
We just show how to prove the inequality (≤) as the other one can be proved in a similar
way. Assume, by contradiction, that the lefthand expression of Equation 4.3 is strictly
greater that the righthand expression. This means that there exists a strategy σ1 for Player
1 such that l
σ2
E(M sσ1,σ2) >
∑
i∈I
π(s)(ti) ·
(⊔
σi1
l
σi2
E(M tiσ1,σ2)
)
(4.4)
holds. Since s ∈ SN , i.e., the state s is under the control of Nature, no action is made
by either Player 1 or Player 2 at s, because the game progresses to some state t ∈ E(s)
accordingly with the random choice of Nature. Let us define, for every i∈I, the strategy τ i1
for Player 1 as follows: τ i1(~s) = σ1(s.~s), for paths ~s starting at ti. We do not need describe
the behavior of τ i1 at paths of different kind. Informally the strategy τi, when the game
starts at ti, acts as the strategy σ1 when the game starts at s and Nature moves from s to
ti. The assumption of Equation 4.4 clearly implies that the following inequalityl
σ2
E(M sσ1,σ2) >
∑
i∈I
π(s)(ti) ·
(l
σi2
E(M ti
τ i1,σ
i
2
)
)
(4.5)
holds. This in turn implies, since the set I is countable, that there exist strategies {τ i2}i∈I ,
such that the inequality l
σ2
E(M sσ1,σ2) >
∑
i∈I
π(s)(ti) ·E(M
ti
τ i1,τ
i
2
) (4.6)
holds. Let us define the strategy σ2 for Player 2 as follows: σ2(s.~t) = τ
i
2(~t), for paths ~t
starting at ti, for i ∈ I. We do not need describe the behavior of σ2 at paths of different
kind, i.e., on paths not starting at s. Informally the strategy σ2, when the game starts at
s and Nature randomly chooses to move to the state ti, for i∈I, play the rest of the game
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s
ti
λi ...
M ti
τ i1,τ
i
2
tj
λj ...
M
tj
τ j1 ,τ
j
2
Figure 2: Markov chain M sσ1,σ2
as the strategy τ i2 would when the game starts at ti. It then follows from Equation 4.6 that
the following inequality
E(M sσ1,σ2) >
∑
i∈I
π(s)(ti) · E(M
ti
τ i1,τ
i
2
) (4.7)
holds.
We have just proved how the truth of Equation 4.7 follows from the assumption of
Equation 4.2. We now derive the desired contradiction, by proving that Equation 4.7 does
not hold because its two expression are equivalent.
It follows immediately from the definition of the strategies {τ i1}i∈I and σ2, that the
Markov chain M sσ1,σ2 can be depicted as if Figure 2, where the letters i, j range over I,
the value labeling the edge connecting s with tj stands for π(s)(ti) and highlights the fact
that that edge is chosen by Nature with probability λi, and the subtree of M
s
σ1,σ2 rooted at
the state ti is precisely the Markov chain M
ti
τ i1,τ
i
2
induced by the strategies τ i1 and τ
i
2 at the
starting state ti.
It follows from Definition 4.7 that the probability measure PMsσ1,σ2
induced by M sσ1,σ2
assigns probability 0 to the set of paths not starting at the state s. It then follows that the
equality
E(M sσ1,σ2)
def
=
∫
PA
Φ〈Pr,R〉 d P
s
σ1,σ2 =
∑
i∈I
( ∫
Os.ti
Φ〈Pr,R〉 d P
s
σ1,σ2
)
.
holds, where Os.ti denotes the open set of paths having s and ti as first and second state
respectively. Furthermore, again by Definition 4.7, the probability measure PMsσ1,σ2 assigns
probability π(s)(ti) to the set Os.ti . From this observation, the previous considerations
on the structure of M sσ1,σ2 and its sub-Markov chains M
ti
τ i1,τ
i
2
and Equation 4.1, it follows
immediately that the equality
1
π(s)(ti)
·
( ∫
Os.ti
Φ〈Pr,R〉 d P
s
σ1,σ2
)
=
∫
P
Φ〈Pr,R〉 d P
ti
τ i1,τ
i
2
holds, where Pti
τ i1,τ
i
2
is the probability measure over paths induced by the Markov chain
M ti
τ i1,τ
i
2
. This concludes the proof.
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5. Stochastic parity games for pLµ
In this section we define the game semantics of the probabilistic modal µ-calculus, in terms
of 212 -player parity games.
Given a PLTS 〈P, {
a
−→}a∈L〉, a pLµ formula F and an interpretation ρ of the variables,
we denote with GFρ the parity game 〈A,Φ〈Pr,R〉〉 formally defined as follows. The state space
of the arena A=〈(S,E), {S1, S2, SN}, π〉, is the set S=(P ×Sub(F ))∪ (D(P )×Sub(F )) of
pairs of states p∈P or probability distributions d∈D(P ), and subformulas G∈Sub(F ). The
transition relation E is defined as E(〈d,G〉) = {〈p,G〉 | p ∈ supp(d)} for every probability
distribution d∈D(P ) and E(〈p,G〉), for p∈P , is defined by case analysis on the outermost
connective of G as follows:
(1) if G = X, with X free in F , then E(〈p,G〉)=∅.
(2) if G = X, withX bound in F by the subformula ⋆X.H, with ⋆∈{µ, ν}, then E(〈p,G〉)=
{〈p,H〉}.
(3) if G=⋆X.H, with ⋆∈{µ, ν}, then E(〈p,G〉)={〈p,H〉}.
(4) if G=〈a〉H or G=[a]H then E(〈p,G〉)={〈d,H〉 | p
a
−→ d}.
(5) if G=H ∨H ′ or G=H ∧H ′ then E(〈p,G〉)={〈p,H〉, 〈p,H ′〉}
The partition {S1, S2, SN} is defined as follows: every state 〈p,G〉 with G’s main connective
in {〈a〉,∨, µX} or with G=X where X is a µ-variable, is in S1. Dually every state 〈p,G〉
with G’s main connective in {[a] ,∧, νX} or with G = X where X is a ν-variable, is in
S2. Every state 〈d,G〉 is in SN . Finally, the terminal states 〈p,X〉, with X free in F ,
are in S1 by convention. The probability transition function π : SN →D(S) is defined as
π(〈d,G〉)(〈p,G〉)=d(p). The priority assignment Pr is defined as usual in µ-calculus games
(see, e.g., [5]). The priority assigned to the states 〈p,X〉, with X a µ-variable, is a positive
odd number; dually the priority assigned to the states 〈p,X〉, with X a ν-variable, is a
positive even number. Moreover Pr(〈p,X〉) > Pr(〈p′,X ′〉) if X subsumes X ′ in F . All other
states get priority 0. The terminal reward assignment R is defined as R(〈p,X〉) = ρ(X)(p)
for every terminal state 〈p,X〉 with X free in F . All other terminal states in GFρ are either
of the form 〈p, 〈a〉H〉 or 〈p, [a]H〉, with {d |p
a
−→ d} = ∅. The reward assignment R is
defined on these terminal states as follows: R(〈p, 〈a〉H〉) = 0 and R(〈p, [a]H〉) = 1. This
implements the policy that a player loses if they get stuck at these kind of states.
Observe that from the above definitions, in general, a pLµ game state s∈S1∪S2 can
have uncountably many E-successors. However the set supp(π(s)) of E-successors of any
state s∈SN is at most countable.
We are now ready to state our main theorem which asserts that every pLµ-game is de-
termined, and that the value of the game at each state 〈p, F 〉 coincides with the denotational
interpretation JF Kρ at p.
Theorem 5.1. Given an arbitrary PLTS 〈P, {
a
−→}a∈L〉, for every pLµ formula F , inter-
pretation ρ and process-state p∈P , the following equalities hold:
JF Kρ(p) = V al↓(GFρ )(〈p, F 〉) = V al↑(GFρ )(〈p, F 〉).
In particular pLµ games are determined.
The proof of theorem 5.1 is carried out in full detail in Section 6.
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6. Proof of Theorem 5.1
As anticipated in the introduction, the main difficulty in proving Theorem 5.1 is that in
general, as stated in Proposition 4.18, optimal strategies, or even memoryless ǫ-optimal
strategies may not exist in a given pLµ-game. This compels us to use a different technique
than the one adopted in, e.g., [21, 15], which is based on the existence of optimal mem-
oryless strategies. Moreover, as observed earlier, since pLµ-games might have states with
uncountably many successors, even the determinacy of pLµ-games does not follow directly
from Theorem 4.14.
The proof technique we adopt is similar to the unfolding method of [5]. The unfolding
method can be roughly described as a technique for proving properties of (some sort of)
two-player parity games by induction on the number of priorities used in the game. Usually,
the first step is to prove that the property under consideration holds for all parity games
with just one priority. Then the the general result for games with n+1 priorities follows by
some argument making use of the inductive hypothesis. In our setting we are interested in
pLµ-games of the form GFρ , and the property we want to prove is that the lower and upper
values of these games coincide with the denotational value of F under the interpretation ρ.
We prove this by induction of the structure of F rather than on the number of priorities
used in the game GFρ . This allows a more transparent and arguably simpler proof.
More formally we shall prove, by induction on the structure of the formulas, that the
following equations hold for every PLTS L = 〈P, {
a
−→}a∈L〉, pLµ formula F and [0, 1]-
interpretation ρ of the variables:
∀G ∈ Sub(F ), JGKρ(p) = V al↓(GGρ )(〈p,G〉) = V al↑(GGρ )(〈p,G〉). (6.1)
Base case: G=X, for some variable X∈V ar.
For every process state p ∈ P and every interpretation ρ, the equality JXKρ(p) = ρ(X)(p)
holds by Definition 3.4. In the game GXρ the state 〈p,X〉 is terminal (and therefore the game
immediately terminates when starting at this state) and the terminal reward assignment R
is defined as R(〈p,X〉) = ρ(X)(p). The desired result (6.1) then follows by application of
Proposition 4.19.
Inductive case G=G1 ∨G2.
For every process state p ∈ P and every interpretation ρ, we have by Definition 3.4 that
JG1∨G2Kρ(p)=JG1Kρ(p)⊔JG2Kρ(p) holds. Let us consider the state 〈p,G1∨G2〉 of the game
GG1∨G2ρ . This state is in S1, i.e., under the control of Player 1, which can choose to move
either to 〈p,G1〉 or 〈p,G2〉. Observe that once the state 〈p,G1 ∨G2〉 is left after the initial
move, it is not reachable again in the game. Moreover, once the state 〈p,Gi〉 is reached,
i∈{1, 2}, the rest of the game is identical to the game GGiρ (starting at 〈p,Gi〉). If follows
from these observations that the equality
V al⋆(G
G
ρ )(〈p,Gi〉) = V al⋆(G
Gi
ρ )(〈p,Gi〉) (6.2)
holds, for i∈{1, 2} and ⋆∈{↑, ↓}. By induction hypothesis we know that the equalities
JGiKρ(p) = V al↓(GGiρ )(〈p,Gi〉) = V al↑(GGiρ )(〈p,Gi〉) (6.3)
hold, for i∈ {1, 2} and ⋆∈ {↑, ↓}. The desired result (6.1) then follows immediately from
equations 6.2 and 6.3 by application of Proposition 4.19.
Inductive case G=G1 ∧G2.
Similar to the previous one.
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Inductive case G=〈a〉G1.
For every process state p∈P and interpretation ρ, we have that the equality J〈a〉G1Kρ(p)=⊔
p
a
−→d
( ∑
q∈supp(d)
d(q)·JG1Kρ(q)) holds, by Definition 3.4. Let us consider the state 〈p, 〈a〉G1〉 of
the game G
〈a〉G1
ρ . This state is in S1, i.e., under the control of Player 1, which can move to a
state in the (possibly empty) set {〈d,G1〉 | p
a
−→ d}. As a first observation, note that if the
set of a-successors of p, i.e., the set {d | p
a
−→ d}, is empty, then 〈p, 〈a〉G1〉 is a terminal state
and the terminal reward assignment R is defined as R(〈p, 〈a〉G1〉) = 0. The desired result
(6.1) then follows by Proposition 4.19. Let us then assume that {d | p
a
−→ d}={di}i∈I , for
some non empty index-set I. Each state 〈di, G1〉 is under the control of Nature which moves
to the state 〈q,G1〉 with probability di(q). More formally we have that 〈di, G1〉 ∈SN and
π
(
〈di, G1〉
)
(〈q,G1〉) = di(q). Once the state 〈di, G1〉 is left, and the state 〈q,G1〉 is reached,
the rest of the game is identical to the game GG1ρ (starting at 〈q,Gi〉), by considerations
analogous to those discussed for the case G=G1∨G2 above. If follows from this observation
that the equality
V al⋆(G
〈a〉G1
ρ )(〈q,G1〉) = V al⋆(G
G1
ρ )(〈q,G1〉) (6.4)
holds for ⋆∈{↑, ↓}. By induction hypothesis we know that the equalities
JG1Kρ(q) = V al↓(GG1ρ )(〈q,G1〉) = V al↑(GG1ρ )(〈q,G1〉) (6.5)
hold, where ⋆∈{↑, ↓}, for every process state q. By applying twice the result of Proposition
4.19 it then follows that
V al⋆(G
〈a〉G1
ρ )(〈di, G1〉) =
∑
q∈supp(d)
d(q)·JG1Kρ(q) (6.6)
for ⋆∈{↑, ↓} and every di∈E(p), and
V al⋆(G
〈a〉G1
ρ )(〈p, 〈a〉G1〉) =
⊔
p
a
−→d
( ∑
q∈supp(d)
d(q)·JG1Kρ(q)) (6.7)
hold as desired.
Inductive case G=[a]G1.
Similar to the previous one.
Inductive case G=µX.G1.
For every process state p and every interpretation ρ we have, by Definition 3.4, that the
following equality holds:
JµX.G1Kρ(p) def= lfp
(
λf ∈ [0, 1]P .
(JG1Kρ[f/X]))(p).
By the Knaster-Tarski theorem, the previous equation can be rewritten as:
JµX.G1Kρ(p) =
⊔
α
JG1Kαρ , (6.8)
where α ranges over the ordinals, and JG1Kαρ is defined as ⊔β<αJG1Kρ[JG1Kβρ/X]. Let us denote
with γ the least ordinal such that JG1Kγρ = JµX.G1Kρ, and with ργ∈ [0, 1]P the interpretation
ρ[JG1Kγρ/X]. Thus, the following equation holds:
JG1Kργ = JµX.G1Kρ. (6.9)
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Let us now turn our attention to the 212 -player parity game G
µX.G1
ρ . Our goal is to
prove Equation 6.1, i.e., that the following equalities
JµX.G1Kρ(p) = V al↓(GµX.G1ρ )(〈p, µX.G1〉) = V al↑(GµX.G1ρ )(〈p, µX.G1〉) (6.10)
hold, for every p∈P . As a first observation, note that the state 〈p, µX.G1〉 is not reachable
by any other game state, and that it has the state 〈p,G1〉 as its only successor state. It then
follows by application of Proposition 4.19 that, in order to prove the desired result (6.10),
we just have to show that the equalities
JG1Kργ(p) = V al↓(GµX.G1ρ )(〈p,G1〉) = V al↑(GµX.G1ρ )(〈p,G1〉) (6.11)
hold. In order to improve readability, we shall denote with LµX.G1 M⋆ρ : P → [0, 1] the
function defined as λp∈P.
(
V al⋆
(
GµX.G1ρ
)
(〈p,G1〉)
)
, for ⋆∈{↓, ↑}. Thus, Equation 6.11 can
be rewritten as follows:
JG1Kργ (p) = LµX.G1 M↓ρ(p) = LµX.G1 M↑ρ(p). (6.12)
Note that the analogous functions LG1 M⋆ρ[f/X] :P→ [0, 1] specified, for ⋆∈{↓, ↑}, as
λp∈P.
(
V al⋆
(
GG1ρ[f/X]
)
(〈p,G1〉)
)
, satisfy the following equation:
JG1Kρ[f/X] = LG1 M↓ρ[f/X] = LG1 M↑ρ[f/X] (6.13)
for all f ∈ [0, 1]P , by induction hypothesis on G1.
We prove Equation 6.12 by exploiting the similarities between the game GµX.G1ρ and
the game GG1ρ[f/X], for every f ∈ [0, 1]
P . The two games are indeed almost identical and differ
only in the following two points:
(1) the set of game states of GµX.G1ρ consists of the game states of G
G1
ρ[f/X] plus the set
{〈p, µX.G1〉 | p∈P},
(2) the states of the form 〈p,X〉, for p∈P , are terminal in the game GG1ρ[f/X] and, instead,
have the state 〈p,G1〉 as unique successor in G
µX.G1
ρ .
The first point does not contribute to any significant difference between the two games,
because, as already observed earlier, the states of the form 〈p, µX.G1〉, for p ∈ P , have a
unique child and once left are not reachable again in the game, and hence can be ignored
completely. Thus, in what follows, we will assume that the two games GµX.G1ρ and G
G1
ρ[f/X]
have the same set of states. The second point is, on the other hand, an important one. In
the game GG1ρ[f/X], when a state of the form 〈p,X〉 is reached, the play ends with reward
f(p) for Player 1. In the game GµX.G1ρ , instead, the game progresses to the state 〈p,G1〉
and, from there, continues.
Given these observations it is clear that any finite path in GG1ρ[f/X] is also a finite path
in GµX.G1ρ . Moreover we define the functions count and tail from finite paths in G
µX.G1
ρ to
natural numbers and finite paths in GG1
ρ[f/X]
respectively, as follows:
count(~s) = |{〈q,X〉.〈q,G1〉 ∈ ~s | q∈P}|
and
tail(~s) =
{
~s if count(~s)=0
~t if ~s=~s′.〈q,X〉.~t and count(~t) = 0, for q∈P
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In other words count(~s) gives us the number of occurrences of pairs of (adjacent) states of
the form 〈q,X〉 and 〈q,G1〉 in ~s, for q∈P , and the finite path tail(~s) is obtained by removing
from ~s the initial prefix up to the last occurrence of a state of the form 〈q,X〉 (immediately
followed by the state 〈q,G1〉) in ~s. Note that tail(~s) is indeed a finite path in G
G1
ρ[f/X]. The
function count extends to an operation from completed (i.e., either terminated or infinite)
paths to N ∪ {∞} as expected. Similarly, we extend the function tail to an operation from
infinite paths ~s in GµX.G1ρ (such that count(~s) < ∞) to infinite paths in G
G1
ρ[f/X], in the
obvious way.
As a further remark about the similarities between the two games GµX.G1ρ and G
G1
ρ[f/X],
observe that the priorities assigned to the states of the two games coincide (or at least the
can be made to coincide) except that the states of the form 〈p,X〉 are assigned priority 0
in GG1ρ[f/X] and maximal priority in G
µX.G1
ρ . Similarly, the terminal reward assignments of
the two games coincide on all terminal states except that, on those of the form 〈p,X〉, the
reward assignment of GµX.G1ρ is not defined since because, as observed before, 〈p,X〉 is not
a terminal state in GµX.G1ρ . It is then simple to verify that the following property holds for
every completed path ~s in GµX.G1ρ :
ΦµX.G1ρ (~s) =
{
0 if count(~s) =∞
ΦG1ρ[f/X]
(
tail(~s)
)
otherwise
(6.14)
where ΦµX.G1ρ and Φ
G1
ρ[f/X] denote the payoff functions of the two games G
µX.G1
ρ and G
G1
ρ[f/X]
respectively. The first clause of Equation 6.14 holds because the priority assigned to states
of the form 〈p,X〉 is odd and maximal in GµX.G1ρ . The second clause follows immediately
by previous observations.
One last observation, which follows immediately from previous considerations about
the similarities between the two games GµX.G1ρ and G
G1
ρ[f/X], is the following:
LµX.G1 M⋆ρ = LG1 M⋆ρ[LµX.G1 M⋆ρ/X]
Eq. 6.13
= JG1Kρ[LµX.G1 M⋆ρ/X] (6.15)
for ⋆ ∈ {↓, ↑}. By application of Equation 6.13, this implies that both LµX.G1 M↑ρ and
LµX.G1 M↓ρ are fixed points of λf ∈ [0, 1]P .(JG1Kρ[f/X]). Note that, for all p∈P , the inequality
LµX.G1 M↓ρ(p) ≤ LµX.G1 M↑ρ(p) holds. Moreover the inequality JµX.G1Kρ(p) ≤ LµX.G1 M↓ρ(p)
hods, for all p∈P , because JµX.G1Kρ (or, equivalently, JG1Kργ ) is the least fixed point of
λf ∈ [0, 1]P .(JG1Kρ[f/X]).
We shall prove the desired result (Equation 6.12) by showing that, for all p ∈ P , the
inequality
LµX.G1 M↑ρ(p) def= V al↑(GµX.G1ρ )(〈p,G1〉) ≤ JG1Kργ (p) (6.16)
holds. We do this by constructing, for every ǫ > 0 and for every k ∈N, a strategy σ
[k]
2 for
Player 2 in the game GµX.G1ρ , satisfying the following inequality:⊔
σ1
E(M
〈p,G1〉
σ1,σ
[k]
2
) < JG1Kργ (p) + ǫ2k . (6.17)
Let us fix an arbitrary ǫ > 0. In what follows, we adopt the convention of using σ and τ
to range over strategies in the games GµX.G1ρ and GG1ργ respectively. The strategy σ
[k]
2 , for
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k∈N, is built using the collection of δ-optimal strategies τ δ2 , with δ>0, for Player 2 in the
game GG1ργ , i.e., strategies τ
δ
2 such that the inequality⊔
τ1
M
〈q,G1〉
τ1,τδ2
<V al↑(G
G1
ργ )(〈q,G1〉) + δ (6.18)
holds, for every q∈P . The strategy σ
[k]
2 is defined as follows:
σ
[k]
2 (~s) =
{
τ
ǫ
2k+1
2 (~s) if count(~s)=0
σ
[k+i]
2 (~t) if count(~s)= i>0 and ~t= tail(~s)
where the function count and tail have been defined earlier. The strategy σ
[k]
2 can be
informally described as follows: at the beginning of the game, σ
[k]
2 initially behaves as the
strategy τ
ǫ
2k+1
2 . If a state of the form 〈q,X〉, for q∈P , is ever reached, then Player 2 forgets
the previous game-history and improves their strategy behaving, from the subsequent state
〈p,G1〉, as the strategy σ
[k+1]
2 . Further changes of strategy, from σ
[i]
2 to σ
[i+1]
2 , for i ∈ N,
are repeated every time a state of the form 〈q′,X〉 is reached, for q′∈P . This means that
on a history of the form ~s= ~s′.〈q,X〉.~t, where 〈q,X〉 is the last occurrence of a state of the
form 〈q′,X〉 in ~s, the choice of σ
[k]
2 at ~s coincides with that of σ
[k+i]
2 (or equivalently with
τ
ǫ
2k+i+1
2 ) at ~t, where i=count(~s).
In other words Player 2, using the strategy σ
[k]
2 , plays in G
µX.G1
ρ as if they were playing
in the game GG1ργ , and every time a state of the form 〈q,X〉 is reached, they re-start again
(from the unique successor 〈q,G1〉 of 〈q,X〉) as if they ware in G
G1
ργ , but with an improved
strategy.
We now prove that, for every k ∈ N, the strategy σ
[k]
2 satisfies the desired Inequality
6.17. Let us fix an arbitrary strategy σ1 for Player 1 in the game G
µX.G1
ρ . We just need to
show that the inequality
E(M
〈p,G1〉
σ1,σ
[k]
2
)<JG1Kργ (p) + ǫ2k (6.19)
holds. Let us denote with X n, for n∈N, the sets of completed paths ~s in GµX.G1ρ such that
count(~s)=n. Let X≺n be the set
⋃
i≺nX
i, for ≺∈ {<,≤}. Similarly, let us denote with X∞
the set of completed paths ~s in GµX.G1ρ such that count(~s) =∞. The following equalities
hold:
E(M
〈p,G1〉
σ1,σ
[k]
2
)
def
=
∫
P
ΦµX.G1ρ dP
〈p,G1〉
σ1,σ
[k]
2
=A
∑
n∈N
∫
Xn
ΦµX.G1ρ dP
〈p,G1〉
σ1,σ
[k]
2
+
∫
X∞
ΦµX.G1ρ dP
〈p,G1〉
σ1,σ
[k]
2
=B
∑
n∈N
∫
Xn
ΦµX.G1ρ dP
〈p,G1〉
σ1,σ
[k]
2
=C
⊔
n∈N
∫
X≤n
ΦµX.G1ρ dP
〈p,G1〉
σ1,σ
[k]
2
The validity of equations A and C comes from countable additivity and ω-continuity of the
probability measure P
〈p,G1〉
σ1,σ
[k]
2
respectively, and the validity of equation B follows from the
fact that ΦµX.G1ρ (~s)=0, for every ~s ∈ X∞ (see Equation 6.14).
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〈p,G1〉
X 0
〈q0,X〉
~t0 ...
〈q0, G1〉
M0
〈qi,X〉 . . .
~ti ...
〈qi, G1〉
Mi
Figure 3: Markov chain M
〈p,G1〉
σ1,σ
[k]
2
in GµX.G1ρ
We now prove, by induction on the natural numbers, that for every n∈N the inequality∫
X≤n
ΦµX.G1ρ dP
〈p,G1〉
σ1,σ
[k]
2
< JG1Kργ (p) +
∑
i≤n
ǫ
2k+i+1
(6.20)
holds. This clearly implies the desired Inequality 6.19 because the indentiy
⊔
n∈N
∑
i≤n
ǫ
2k+i+1
=
ǫ
2k
holds. Suppose, by inductive hypothesis, that the inequality (6.20) holds for all m<n,
for some n∈N. The Markov chain M
〈p,G1〉
σ1,σ
[k]
2
can be depicted as in figure 3 where the triangle
(denoted by X 0) represents the set of paths in M
〈p,G1〉
σ1,σ
[k]
2
never reaching a state of the form
〈q,X〉, for q∈P , and the finite paths (denoted by ~ti) connecting the root 〈p,G1〉 with the
node 〈qi,X〉, for i ∈ I ⊆ N, are the prefixes (up to the first occurrence of a state of the
form 〈qi,X〉) of all paths ~s in M
〈p,G1〉
σ1,σ
[k]
2
of the form ~s=~ti.〈qi, G1〉.~s′. The sub-Markov chains
rooted at ~ti (having 〈qi, G1〉 as initial state) are denoted by Mi, for i∈I.
Note that every path ~s∈X≤n is either a path in X 0, i.e., does not have any occurrences of
states of the form 〈q,X〉, or is in
⋃
0<j≤nX
j . Moreover observe that any path ~s∈
⋃
0<j≤nX
j
in M
〈p,G1〉
σǫ1,σ
[k]
2
, i.e., any path in M
〈p,G1〉
σǫ1,σ
[k]
2
that reaches at least once (and at most n times) a state
of the form 〈q,X〉, can be uniquely written as the concatenation ~s = ~ti.~s′ of some finite
path ~ti (ending in the state 〈qi,X〉, which is the first occurrence of a state of this shape
in ~s) and some completed path ~s′∈X<n, which is necessarily starting at the state 〈qi, G1〉.
Let us denote with ~ti.X
<n, for i∈ I, the set of paths ~s∈
⋃
0<j≤nX
j of the form ~ti.~s′, with
~s′ ∈X<n. Given the previous observations, and since the set I is countable, the following
equality holds:∫
X≤n
ΦµX.G1ρ dP
〈p,G1〉
σ1,σ
[k]
2
=
∫
X 0
ΦµX.G1ρ dP
〈p,G1〉
σ1,σ
[k]
2
+
∑
i∈I
∫
~ti.X<n
ΦµX.G1ρ dP
〈p,G1〉
σ1,σ
[k]
2
(6.21)
Moreover, denoting by π(~ti), for i ∈ I, the multiplication of all probabilities appearing in
the probabilistic steps of the path ~ti, it is simple to check that the following equality holds:∫
~ti.X<n
ΦµX.G1ρ dP
〈p,G1〉
σ1,σ
[k]
2
= π(~ti) ·
∫
X<n
ΦµX.G1ρ dPMi (6.22)
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〈p,G1〉
X 0
〈q0,X〉
~t0 ...
〈qi,X〉 . . .
~ti ...
Figure 4: Markov chain M
〈p,G1〉
τ1,τ
ǫ
2k+1
2
in GG1ργ
where PMi denotes the probability measure over completed paths induced by the sub-Markov
chain Mi.
It follows from the definition of the strategy σ
[k]
2 , that the sub-Markov chainMi, for i∈I,
is generated by the strategy profile 〈σi1, σ
[k+1]
2 〉, where σ
i
1(~s)
def
= σ1(~ti.~s), for all completed
paths ~s having 〈qi, G1〉 as first state. Thus, Mi = M
qi
σi1,σ
[k+1]
2
. It then follows by inductive
hypothesis on n (Inequality 6.20), that the inequality∫
X<n
ΦµX.G1ρ dPMi < JG1Kργ (qi) +
∑
j<n
ǫ
2(k+1)+j+1
(6.23)
holds. Hence, by equations 6.21-6.22, the inequality∫
X≤n
ΦµX.G1ρ dP
〈p,G1〉
σ1,σ
[k]
2
≤
∫
X 0
ΦµX.G1ρ dP
〈p,G1〉
σ1,σ
[k]
2
+
(∑
i∈I
π(~ti) ·
(JG1Kργ (qi)))+∑
j<n
ǫ
2(k+1)+j+1
(6.24)
holds.
Let us now consider the Markov chain (depicted in Figure 4) in the game GG1ργ , obtained
from M
〈p,G1〉
σ1,σ2 by removing the sub-Markov chains Mi, for i∈ I. It follows from definition
of σ
[k]
2 that this is precisely the Markov chain induced by the strategy profile 〈τ1, τ
ǫ
2k+1
2 〉,
where τ1 is the strategy for Player 1 in the game G
G1
ργ which behaves as the strategy σ1 in
the game GG1ργ until a terminal state of the form 〈q,X〉 is reached. The following equations
are easy to verify:
E(M
〈p,G1〉
τ1,τ
ǫ
2k+1
2
)
def
=
∫
P
ΦG1ργ dP
〈p,G1〉
τ1,τ
ǫ
2k+1
2
=A
∫
X 0
ΦG1ργ dP
〈p,G1〉
τ1,τ
ǫ
2k+1
2
+
∑
i∈I
π(~ti) · Φ
G1
ργ (
~ti)
=B
∫
X 0
ΦG1ργ dP
〈p,G1〉
τ1,τ
ǫ
2k+1
2
+
∑
i∈I
π(~ti) · ργ(X)(qi)
=C
∫
X 0
ΦµX.G1ρ dP
〈p,G1〉
τ1,τ
ǫ
2k+1
2
+
∑
i∈I
π(~ti) · ργ(X)(qi)
=D
∫
X 0
ΦµX.G1ρ dP
〈p,G1〉
τ1,τ
ǫ
2k+1
2
+
∑
i∈I
π(~ti) · JG1Kργ (qi).
Step A is justified by the fact that every path in the set X 0 defined earlier is also a path
in the game GG1ργ . Step B follows from the fact that, by definition, Φ
G1
ργ (
~ti) = ργ(X)(qi), for
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every i∈ I and qi= last(~ti). Equation C follows from Equation 6.14. Lastly, Equation D
follows from definition of ργ(X).
By definition, the strategy τ
ǫ
2k+1
2 is
ǫ
2k+1
-optimal (see Inequality 6.18). Thus, it follows
from Equation 6.24 that the inequality∫
X≤n
ΦµX.G1ρ dP
〈p,G1〉
σ1,σ
[k]
2
≤ (JG1Kργ (p) + ǫ2k+1 ) +
∑
j<n
ǫ
2(k+1)+j+1
(6.25)
or equivalently, ∫
X≤n
ΦµX.G1ρ dP
〈p,G1〉
σ1,σ
[k]
2
≤ JG1Kργ (p) +
∑
j≤n
ǫ
2k+j+1
holds. We have then proved that Equation 6.20 holds, as desired. Therefore, following
backwards our previous analysis, Equation 6.19 and, thus, Equation 6.12 hold, and this
concludes the proof.
Inductive case G=νX.G1.
Similar to the previous one.
7. Conclusions and future work
We proved that the denotational and game semantics of [15] of the logic pLµ coincide on all
PLTS’s. This result, which is yet another example of application of game theory to logic,
strengthen the theory of the logic pLµ, which is recently emerging as an interesting tool for
expressing properties and reasoning about PLTS’s.
Further recent research [16, 17], explores the extension of the logic obtained by adding
two new conjunction/disjunction operators called product (·) and coproduct (⊙). The prod-
uct operator, whose denotational semantics is defined as JF ·GK(p)=JF K(p) ·JGK(p), and the
coproduct operator (the De Morgan dual of the product respect to the involution ¬x=1−x)
increases the expressive power of the logic. For instance it is possible to encode the qual-
itative modality P>0F whose semantics can be defined as JP>0F K(p) = 1 if JF K(p) > 0;JP>0F K(p)=0 otherwise. This allows the expression of interesting properties, as well as the
encoding of important temporal probabilistic logics such as (qualitative) PCTL.
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